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The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence:
The Supreme Court and Psychology
J. ALEXANDER TANFORD*
INTRODUCTION
The dominant criticism of law is that it is indeterminate, incoherent and
contradictory.' The law and society movement, building on the work of
legal realists, proposes a solution: a shift to an interdisciplinary, more
scientific jurisprudence. Scholars from Habermas2 to Posner3 assert that the
crisis m modem legal culture will lead courts to give social science a more
prominent role m the formation of legal policy. If precedent and judicial
intuition cannot supply a clear answer to a legal problem, maybe empirical
social science can. At least the apparent neutrality of science can help courts
legitimate their decisions in hard cases. Commentators offer familiar ex-
amples, such as footnote eleven in Brown v. Board of Education,4 as
evidence that social science has already begun to find a place in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence.
To all appearances, social psychology and the law of trials should be
natural allies in the forefront of this movement. A substantial part of the
American trial system is implicitly based on psychology:
* Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana Umversity School of
Law at Bloomington. LL.M., 1979, Duke University. The data on which this Article is based
were onginally presented at the 1988 Law and Society meetings, and the 1988 European Law
and Psychology Conference. Versions of the paper were presented in colloquia at Indiana
Umversity and the University of Miann. Robin Stryker, David Kaye, Sally Lloyd-Bostock,
John Monahan, Mike Saks and Don Gjerdingen provided valuable criticism and help. Philippa
Guthre devoted an enormous amount of her time to editing this Article, and it is substantially
better for her efforts. I dedicate tis Article to Bryant Garth who, as Dean and friend,
supported and encouraged my hesitant entry into interdisciplinary work. If my work does not
live up to the example he has set in his, the failure is the student's, not the teacher's.
1. E.g., Kress, Legal Indeterminancy, 77 CALw. L. R-v. 283, 283-84 (1989); see also
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 11-14 (1984);
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 H.Av. L. Ray. 561, 578 (1983).
2. J. HAmAs, TowAD A R&TIoNAL SociEry 81-85 (J. Shapiro trans. 1970) (scientific
progress undermines traditional legitimating myths and forces state to increasingly rely on
science as an apparently- neutral basis for political decisions; scientific rationality legitimates
the expanding power of state as it intervenes in market to perpetuate obsolete forms of
domination).
3. E.g., R. PosNER, EcoNoIC ANALYsiS OF LAW 20-21 (3d ed. 1986) (economic theory
provides power to explain and clarify values m many fields of law; the stamp of economic
reasoning can be seen in property, contracts, tort and criminal law; economics provides "true"
grounds for many judicial opinions).
4. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.i1 (1954) (citing several social-scientific sources as supporting the
proposition that segregation has a detrimental effect).
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Many of the most fundamental assumptions underlying courtroom trials
are psychological assumptions. For example, the entrusting of ultimate
decision-making powers to juries [is] a policy that assumes that
such groups can understand their task, set aside personal prejudices,
reliably judge the credibility of witnesses, and collectively apply the law
to reach a just verdict. Even the choice of an adversarial system of
justice makes important psychological assumptions concermng meth-
ods of enhancing the perceived fairness and justness of the legal
process. In short, the operation of the courts is predicated upon a host
of psychological assumptions about just how the key actors in the court
(judges, attorneys, defendants, witnesses, and jurors) can and will behave
under a variety of conditions.'
Lawyers already rely on psychologists to help plan effective trial tactics.6
Many courts now accept social psychologists as expert witnesses on issues
such as the problems of eyewitness identification and rape trauma syn-
drome.7
The Supreme Court, however, has not welcomed empirical research on
jury behavior when deciding evidence and trial procedure cases. Instead,
the Justices seem to react to it with distrust and suspicion.' They continue
to approve legal rules based on intuitive assumptions about human behavior
that research by psychologists has shown to be erroneous.9
From 1970 to 1988, the United States Supreme Court decided mnety-two
cases concerning the propriety of various rules of evidence and trial pro-
cedure.' 0 In most of these cases, relevant psychological literature on juror
5. Kerr & Bray, The Psychology of the Courtroom: An Introduction, in Tm PSYCHOLOGY
OF rim CouRpTRooM 2 (N. Kerr & R. Bray eds. 1982).
6. See Tanford & Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-
Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C.L. REv. 741, 775-79 (1988).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Downig, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); State v. Chapple,
135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983) (both cases acknowledging the need to present jurors with
expert testimony about the unreliability of eyewitness identification); see also Greene, Schooler
& Loftus, Expert Psychological Testimony, in Tm PSYCHOLOGY OF EviDENcE AND TRAL
PROCEDURE 206-20 (S. Kassin & L. Wnghtsman eds. 1985) (summarizing the adissibility of
expert testimony on several types of novel psychological evidence, such as rape trauma
syndrome); Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law,
73 VA. L. REv 559 (1987) (discussing the admissibility of expert testimony to provide jurors
with a frame of reference m wich to make better decisions about contested facts).
8. See, e.g., Chief Justice Rehnquist's opimon in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162,
168-73 (1986), in which he spends six pages attacking scientific literature that reaches a
conclusion he does not like.
9. See, e.g., Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981), in which the Court concludes
that eyewitness identification is no different from other kinds of testimony, and that jurors
will be presumed to be able to accurately assess the reliability of eyewitness identification.
Both these premses are contrary to the psychological literature. See Wells, The Eyewitness,
in Tim PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRiAL PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 57-61.
10. Because it is my intention to study the impact of the social-psychology of jury behavior,
I have included all civil and cnminal cases that significantly involved a question of evidence,
trial law or trial procedure. They are listed infra in Appendix II. I have not included cases
raising pretrial procedural issues (e.g., discovery) that mght affect a subsequent trial, sufficiency
of evidence issues, or the substantive validity of jury instructions. I have included death penalty
cases that focus on the procedure for trying capital cases, but not those that question the
constitutionality of the death penalty.
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behavior was readily available in interdisciplinary journals," widely circu-
lated books, 12 law reviews,13 journals for practicing lawyers, 14 law student
textbooks 5 and even the popular press.16 In a number of instances, the
Justices were provided with nonpartisan amicus briefs explaimng in detail
relevant jury behavior research.17 In some cases, the Justices even acknowl-
edged the existence of empirical data.'8 Yet, not a single Supreme Court
majority opinion has relied even partly on the psychology of jury behavior
to justify a decision about the proper way to conduct a trial.
The Court's refusal to base its trial process decisions on psychology
cannot be dismissed with the familiar claim that social science is inconclusive
because there are always experts on both sides. 19 With respect to some issues
that have reached the Court, psychologists have arrived at a clear consensus
about the effect that a procedure would have on the jury and the trial.2
I1. E.g., Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification, 8 LAw &
Htm. BEHAv. 53 (1984); Suggs, The Use of Psychological Research by the Judiciary: Do
Courts Adequately Assess the Validity of the Research?, 3 LAw & Hum. BEHAv 135 (1979)
(effects of reducing jury size); Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions:
When Jurors Use Credibility Evidence to Decide Guilt, 9 LAW & Hum. BEHAV 37 (1985).
12. E.g., V HANs & N. VirmAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986); R. HASTiE, S. PENROD & N.
PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983); D. HoRownz & R. WiLIGING, Tm PSYCHOLOGY OF
LAw (1984); M. SAxs & R. HA=, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN CotmT (1978); B. SLEs, THE
TRIAL PRoCESS (Perspectives m Psychology series 1981); THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND
TRIAL PROCEDURE, supra note 7; THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CouRTRooM, supra note 5.
13. E.g., Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and the
Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. Rv. 644 (1975); Suggs & Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the
Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245 (1981).
14. E.g., Colley, Style, Structure and Semantics, TRIAL, July 1983, at 86 (effect of word
choice and language); Etziom, Creating an Imbalance, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 28 (psycho-
logical jury selection).
15. E.g., W LOH, SoCr RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: CASES, READINGS & TEXT
(1984); J. TANroRD, Tan TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS AND EmIcs (1983).
16. E.g., Etziom, Threatening the Jury Trial, Wash. Post, May 26, 1974, at C3, col. 1
(jury selection procedures); Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, PsY-
CHoLooy TODAY, Dec. 1974, at 116-19 (problems of eyewitness identifications).
17. E.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae the American Psychological Association m Support of
Respondent, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (No. 84-1865) [hereinafter Lockhart
Brief].
18. E.g., Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 302 n.20 (1981).
19. See M. SAKs & C. BARON, TM UsE/NoNUsE/MisusE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN
THE CotTS 75 (1980) (transcript of conference on the use of social science by courts; remarks
by law Professor Stephen Breyer that there are always social scientists on each side, and
arguing that he could produce a scientist to testify in favor of any proposition); see also
Stryker, Limits on Technocratization of the Law: The Elimination of the National Labor
Relations Board's Division of Economic Research, 54 Am. Soc. REv. 341, 342-43 (1989)
(expressing doubts about whether the incorporation of science into law is dependent in any
way on it being used on both sides of an issue); R. Stryker, Limits on Technocratization of
the Law: The Elimination of the NLRB's Division of Economic Research (Umv. Microfilms
1987) (available at the University of Michigan libraries) (detailed historical development of the
same argument).
20. Scientific consensus does not mean that scientists stop being skeptical or discontinue
their attempts to falsify that consensus. Nor does it mean that there are no crackpots or
1990]
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For example, psychologists agree that eyewitness identification of strangers
is unreliable, 21 that the process of death-qualification creates a conviction-
prone jury, 22 and that jurors have difficulty following instructions to dis-
regard or limit their use of prejudicial evidence.? Yet, the Supreme Court
has approved trial procedures inconsistent with each of these findings.?
In some situations, of course, the Court must choose between the need
for fair, accurate trials and competing public policies. Empirical research
might demonstrate that trials reach better results when all relevant evidence
is presented in a publicity-free proceeding, yet the Court may be asked to
compromise pursuit of tins ideal for the sake of preserving a free press, 2
deterring police misconduct26 or protecting the institution of marriage. 7
However, of the mnety-eight Supreme Court cases on trial procedure decided
since 1970,8 only -a few clearly required the Court to make such a choice. 9
In the overwhelming majority of these cases, the Court appeared to consider
only whether a contested procedure interfered with the operation of a fair
trial. Even then the Court would not accept help from psychologists.
This Article explores the puzzling disjunction between the psychology of
juror behavior and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of juror behavior.
Part I describes the interdisciplinary context in which the issue is located.
Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's treatment of psychology in its trial
law cases, focusing on a dozen cases in which the Justices must have been
aware of the scientific literature, because it was cited in one of the opinions
or presented in the briefs.30 Part II also demonstrates that the Justices
consistently ignore, distort and display hostility towards the empirical research,
pseudo-scientists who dispute that consensus. See Gieryn, Bevins & Zehr, Professionalization
of American Scientists: Public Science in the Creation/Evolution Trials, 50 AM. Soc. Rnv
392, 400-02 (1985).
21. See Wells, supra note 9, at 48-57.
22. Lockhart Brief, supra note 17, at 3.
23. L. Wimn-rsmAN, PsYcHoLoGY AND THE LEaAL SYSTEM 250 (1987).
24. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (holding that eyewitness identifications
are reliable); Lockhart, 476 U.S. 162 (holding that death-qualified juries are impartial and not
significantly conviction-prone); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) (assumingjurors will follow an instruction to limit the use of highly inflammatory evidence).
25. E.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (television cameras in the courtroom).
26. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984) (ruling on the scope of the
rule excluding relevant evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment in order to deter
police misconduct).
27. E.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (ruling on the scope of a defendant's
privilege to prevent his spouse from testifying against him).
28. See infra Appendix II.
29. E.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. 40 (fair trial versus marriage confidentiality).
30. In many other cases, it almost defies belief that among nne Supreme Court Justices
and dozens of law clerks, no one was aware of psychological research that had been widely
disseminated in legal periodicals. E.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (constitutionality
of five-out-of-six verdict in criminal case; no mention of jury size or unanimity studies);
Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 438 n.6 (effect of limiting instruction discussed without reference to
empirical research).
[Vol. 66:137
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preferring to trust their own intuitions. Part III examines several theories
offered to account for the disjunction between social science and law, but
finds that none explains this result. Part IV proposes a new theory to
explain why psychology may seem irrelevant to the Supreme Court, based
on a comparison of the normative structures of the two disciplines.
I. BACKGROUND
One of the important themes in law-and-society research is the extent to
which social science is incorporated into the law.3 1 Although much of this
work concerns the legislative and executive branches of government, 32 some
has focused on the courts. The best-known examples of this literature
address the Supreme Court's controversial use of social science in Brown
v. Board of Education.31 However, other research has investigated more
generally the interaction between the scientific and legal systems. 34 Some
scholars have looked at how well social-scientific information is understood
and used by the Supreme Court.35
Others have looked at the use of social science by intermediate appellate
courts,36 trial courts37 and lawyers. 38 A few legal scholars have used social
science as a vehicle for criticizing Supreme Court decisions. 39 Some social
scientists have done the opposite, using legal decisions to criticize aspects
of social theory.' However, little work has focused particularly on the
31. See Caplan, Social Research and National Policy: What Gets Used, by Whom, for
What Purposes and with What Effect?, 38 INT'L SOC. SCL J. 187 (1976); Ellsworth & Getman,
Social Science in Legal Decision-Making, in LAW AND rn SoCIL ScmNcEs 581 (L. Lipton &
S. Wheeler eds. 1986); M. SAKs & C. BARON, supra note 19; C. WEms, UsnIr S6CIL RESEARCH
iN PuBuc Poucy MAKiNG (1977).
32. See, e.g., Fineman & Opie, Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody
Determinations at Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. Rnv 107 (legislative child custody preferences);
Stryker, supra note 19 (discussing the NLRB).
33. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ii (1954), is discussed by P ROSEN,
Tm SuPRim COURT AND SoCIAL ScmNcE 173-77 (1972); Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 150 (1955); Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of
Uncertainty, 6 J. LAw & EDUC. 3 (1977).
34. See M. SAKS & C. BARON, supra note 19; Sperlich, The Evidence on Evidence, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF EvImENCE AND TeiAL PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 326-52.
35. Alschuler, "Close Enough for Government Work" The Exclusionary Rule After Leon,
1984 Sue. Cr. REv. 309 (critiquing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
36. See Suggs, supra note 11 (discussing a number of decisions by federal appeals courts
and state appellate courts).
37. See Hans & Vidmar, Jury Selection, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CoURTRoom, supra
note 5, at 50-54 (discussing the problems of getting trial judges to accept survey data in change
of venue decisions); Saks, Innovation and Change in the Courtroom, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ran COURTROOM, supra note 5, at 338-42 (sentencing decisions).
38. Tanford & Tanford, supra note 6, at 748-59.
39. Alschuler, supra note 35 (criticizing Leon, 468 U.S. 897); Lempert, supra note 13
(criticizing the Court's three jury-size cases).




Supreme Court's use, or nonuse, of empirical research on jury behavior in
formulating trial policy.
The branch of modern psychology devoted to empirical research on jury
behavior and trial procedures developed in part as a response to a 1970
Supreme Court decision, Williams v. Florida.41 In Williams, the Supreme
Court was asked to review Florida's decision to reduce the size of criminal
junes from twelve to six persons. Although most of the Court's opinion
concerns prior legal precedent and the history of juries, the Justices also
made two empirical assertions:
[First,] the reliability of the jury as a fact finder hardly seems likely to
be a function of its size.
[Second,] while in theory the number of viewpoints represented on a
randomly selected jury ought to increase as the size of the jury increases,
in practice the difference between the 12-man [sic] jury and the six-man
[sic] jury in terms of the cross-section of the community represented
seems likely to be negligible.4 2
These assertions seemed to contradict psychological theory. They prompted
several psychologists to begin research on the validity of these and other
behavioral assumptions underlying the rules of evidence and trial proce-
dure. 43
Since 1970, there has been an explosion of applied psychological research
concerning the trial process and jury behavior. By 1982, Bray and Kerr
could identify over seventy completed experimental studies using mock
jurors." In 1988, Tanford and Tanford identified over 120 books and
articles on the psychology of trial practice written since 1970. 45 Bibliographies
in Kerr and Bray, 46 Kassin and Wrightsman 7 and Hastie, Penrod and
Penmngton"8 run to a combined total of over 100 pages.
Over the same eighteen-year period, the Supreme Court decided cases
involving issues of juror behavior and trial procedure49 as if no relevant
41. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
42. Id. at 100-02. The Court implied that what little evidence there was showed no
differences between six-person and 12-person junes. However, the Court cited only the opinions
of lawyers for the proposition. Id. at 101.
43. See, e.g., S. NAGEL & M. NEEF, LEGAL POLICY ANALYSIS: FINDiNG AN OPnm Lmrm.
OR MIx (1977) (jury size and unanimity); M. SAKs, JURY VERDICTS (1977) (jury size and
verdicts); Bermant & Coppock, Outcomes of Six- and Twelve-Member Jury Trials: An Analysis
of 128 Civil Cases in the State of Washington, 48 WASH. L. REv 593 (1973) (jury size).
44. Bray & Kerr, Methodological Considerations in the Study of the Psychology of the
Courtroom, in Tan PSYCHOLOGY OF TH CourTRooM, supra note 5, at 288-89.
45. Tanford & Tanford, supra note 6.
46. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 5, at 9-10, 34-37, 77-82, 111-15, 158-
68, 191-94, 217-20, 253-56, 281-83, 318-23, 349-52.
47. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 38-39, 63-66,
92-94, 121-23, 147-49, 171-74, 198-200, 222-26, 250-52, 276-79, 296-97, 321-22, 354-61.
48. R. HASTE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 12, at 247-65.
49. See infra Appendix II.
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psychological research existed. Sometimes the Court's nonscientific approach
was unavoidable. In a few cases, no empirical research had been conducted
on the issues being litigated. In Batson v. Kentucky,50 for example, the
American Civil Liberties Union asserted that a jury without black members
would give less credit to the testimony of black witnesses. No psychologist
had published any research investigating that issue. 51 Similarly, in Chandler
v. Florida,5 2 a defendant objected to the presence of cameras in the court-
room, asserting that their presence would adversely affect the trial. The
Court pointed to the absence of empirical data on such practices as one
reason not to prohibit them.5 3
In a few other cases, the research was tentative or inconclusive. For
example, ,in Kentucky v. Stincer,54 the Court was asked to rule on the
constitutionality of a rule protecting child sex abuse victims from having to
confront defendants. The American Psychological Association (the "APA")
filed. an amicus curiae brief stating that psychologists did not yet know
whether face-to-face confrontation between the victim and the accused would
cause particular trauma to the child. They cited the few studies that had
been done, indicating that the results were inconclusive. Some research
suggested the child mght be harmed, while other research suggested that a
confrontation is cathartic and beneficial to the child.55
In some situations, the Court may have been unaware of available relevant
research. Since neither the Justices nor their clerks are likely to be trained
in psychology, they would probably only be alerted to relevant research if
scientific literature were cited m the briefs or had been presented previously
to the Court.56 For example, in Addington v. Texas,57 the Court was asked
to determine the appropriate burden of proof in civil commitment trials.
The Court lamented that there were no directly relevant empirical studies
50. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
51. The brief only cited irelevant experiments on the problems of cross-racial identifica-
tions. Brief for the New York Civil Liberties Umon and the American Civil Liberties Umon
as Armcus Curiae, Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (No. 84-6263) (citing E. LoFrus, Eyawnim "sTmoNy
(1979)); Malpass & Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race, 31 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PsycaoLobY 330 (1979).
52. 449 U.S. 560, 578-79 (1981).
53. The appellant appears to have looked for relevant research, but found only irrelevant
studies about such matters as whether people become distracted by music or tend to conform
when in public. Brief for Appellant at 28-31, Chandler, 449 U.S. 560 (No. 79-1260); cf. Estes
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (reaching an opposite result based on lack of empirical evidence
to show cameras had no effect).
54. 479 U.S. 1303 (1987).
55. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Petitioner
at 15-26, Stincer, 479 U.S. 1303 (No. 86-572).
56. Since law journals and interdisciplinary journals likely to be found in any standard
library contain much relevant empirical work, this information was easily accessible had the
Justices or their clerks bothered to look for it. However, my conversations with former
Supreme Court clerks indicate that such proactive research is almost never undertaken.
57. 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
1990]
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on how jurors interpret the phrases "preponderance of the evidence," "clear
and convincing" and "beyond a reasonable doubt." In point of fact, at
least one such study did exist.58
The absence of interdisciplinary education can also result m the judges,
clerks and lawyers involved in a case failing to recognize that a psychological
issue is implicated. For example, m a series of cases about whether voir
dire had been adequate to detect racially biased jurors, 59 everyone apparently
assumed that jurors would admit to being racially biased if asked. They
seemed unaware of either the large body of social psychology addressing
human behavior in public settings, or the experiments specifically examining
juror behavior, all of which cast doubt on the validity of that assumption. 60
However, in some cases, none of the excuses work. Even when the Court
clearly was aware of relevant psychological literature, 61 it still paid it little
attention. The Court has consistently ignored or distorted the scientific
literature on juror behavior and made assertions inconsistent with such
literature in its opimons. In the following sections, cases in which the
Supreme Court rejected empirical data on jury behavior will be analyzed
and used to test traditional theories of the interaction between science and
law
II. TE SuPREME CoURT's TREATMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
The Supreme Court has decided twelve cases with all five of the following
characteristics: (1) a question of proper trial procedure was involved that
required making an assumption about juror behavior, (2) the need for fair,
reliable trials was the only public policy directly implicated by the decision,
(3) relevant empirical research on juror behavior was available, (4) a
consensus appeared to exist among social psychologists concerning the
implications of that research and (5) the relevant psychological literature
was cited either in the briefs or in one of the opinions. In ten of these
cases, the Court based its decisions on intuitive assertions about juror
behavior inconsistent with the empirical data. In the two cases m which the
58. See R. SIMON, THE JuRY: ITs ROLE IN AsmicAN SocmTY 56 (1980) (tables 4-4 and 4-
5); Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof. A View From the Bench, the Jury, and
the Classroom, 5 LAW & Soc'Y Rnv 319 (1971).
59. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); Ham v.
South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
60.. See Balch, Griffiths, Hall & Winfree, The Socialization of Jurors, 4 J. CauM. JuST.
271 (1976); Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations, 38 S. CAL. L. Rnv 503, 510-14 (1965); Helmreich
& Collins, Situational Determinants of Affiliative Preference Under Stress, 6 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 79 (1967); McGhee & Teevan, Conformity Behavior and Need for
Affiliation, 72 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 117 (1967); Suggs & Sales, supra note 13, at 259-60.
61. The cases are described infra in Appendix I.
[Vol. 66:137
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Court and the psychologists agreed about how jurors behave, the Court
made it clear that it was not relying on psychology. 62
An examination of the written opinions in these cases reveals that the
Justices ignored, misused, distorted and misinterpreted psychological' liter-
atire about trials to justify decisions at odds with empirical data. This
pattern is consistent with evidence that lower court judges tend to be hostile
to social science, 63 that lawyers tend to be hostile toward scientists" and
misunderstand or ignore social science 5 and that people generally undervalue
social science and overvalue vivid anecdotes when making important deci-
sions. 66 The Supreme Court's most explicit and detailed discussion of social
psychology occurs in Lockhart v. McCree.67 The case involved a claim that
the process of death qualifications produces a jury biased in favor of the
state at the guilt-determination stage, thus violating a defendant's right to
an impartial jury The APA filed an amicus curiae brief discussing at length
the large body of data demonstrating that death-qualified juries are indeed
conviction-prone. The APA concluded that "without credible exception, the
research studies show that death qualified juries are prosecution prone,
unrepresentative of the community, and that death qualification impairs
proper jury functioning .... [T]he research clearly satisfies the criteria for
evaluating the methodological soundness, reliability, and utility of empirical
research." 69
In the Supreme Court's majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist attacked the
empirical studies. Despite assurances from the APA that the research was
methodologically sound, and despite the fact that he has no training in
62. See infra Appendix I (Carter and Gray cases).
63. See Hans & Vidmar, supra note 37, at 54-55 (trial judges are hostile to statistical
evidence m change-of-venue proceedings); Sperlich, supra note 34, at 337-42 (summarizing
judicial complaints about science).
64. Stryker, supra note 19, at 351-53 (intra-agency squabbling between lawyers and econ-
omists contributed to the elimination of NLRB's Division of Economic Research).
65. Tanford & Tanford, supra note 6, at 748-59 (pointing out that lawyers misunderstand
psychology); see also Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of Evidence, 3
ILL. L. Rnv 399 (1909) (ridiculing psychological research and belittling psychologists' offer to
help construct more rational rules of evidence).
66. R. NISBET & L. Ross, HuAN INFERENCE: STRATmois AN SHORTco aNOs OF SocIAL
JUDomENT 55-56 (1980); Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial
by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'Y Ra,. 123, 149 (1981); see also Thompson & Schumann,
Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the
Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHv. 167 (1987) (college students rmsunderstood
and underutilized statistics when playing the role of jurors).
67. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
68. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Supreme Court approved the use
in capital cases of a procedure whereby all prospective jurors who were opposed to the death
penalty were excused for cause. This process has become known as "death qualifying" the
jury. It is a significant strategic advantage to prosecutors because it enables them to remove
hostile jurors without having to use up one of a limited number of peremptory challenges.
69. Lockhart Brief, supra note 17, at 3.
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social science methods, Rehnquist devoted five pages of his majority opinion
to assailing the methodology used in the cited research. Rehnquist's indict-
ment of the empirical literature contains six counts: First, "only" six studies
specifically demonstrated conviction-proneness, too small a number from
which to draw reliable conclusions. Another eight corroborating studies were
dismissed as having no value because they examined juror attitudes rather
than actions.70 Second, three of the six relevant studies had previously been
presented to the Court in connection with another case, 71 at which time
they were described as being too tentative to serve as-a basis for a decision.
Therefore, despite subsequent validating research, they were still of no
value.7 2 Third, three of the six studies demonstrating a strong conviction-
proneness effect used randomly selected individuals, not real jurors actually
sworn to apply the law Therefore, the studies cannot predict the behavior
of actual jurors and should be ignored.7 3 Fourth, two experiments that did
use actual jurors did not simulate the deliberation process, and therefore
were of no value.7 4 Fifth, the studies did not say whether the final result,
considering all the evidence, would definitely be different if the jury were
not death-qualified.7 5 Finally, only one study investigated the possibility of
the independent "nullifier" phenomenon, that is, whether someone opposed
to the death penalty would vote not guilty just to prevent a death sentence. 76
Justice Rehnquist then contended that other serious methodological problems
existed, but stated that he did not have time to mention them. 77
There is, of course, a modicum of truth to several of these criticisms.
One must be careful about over-generalizing from mock jury studies to real
juries, from attitudes to actions, from pre-deliberation to post-deliberation
decisions and from statistical significance to actual impact in real cases.
However, these problems are well known to experimental psychologists. In
the opinion of the APA, the variety of conditions under which the death-
qualification experiments were conducted, the safeguards used, the number
of replications and the complete absence of any data to the contrary justified
the conclusion that death-qualified juries are in fact conviction-prone. 78
70. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 169.
71. The other case was Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510.
72. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 170-71.
73. Id. at 171.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 171-72.
76. The study that did take into consideration "nullifiers" is the Cowan-Deliberation study.
Id. at 172, n.12. Justice Rehnquist may have assumed that the presence of "nullifiers" would
have to be a dependent variable, that is, would necessarily result in a not guilty vote.
77. Rehnquist wrote that he had only taken the time to identify "some of the more serious
problems" with the studies, implying there are more that he did not discuss. Id. at 173
(emphasis added).
78. See Lockhart Brief, supra note 17, at 3.
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Justice Rehnquist, however, exaggerated the significance of the criticisms,
asserting that because such studies can be criticized, they are of no value.
He then posited that even assuming the experiments were methodologically
sound,7 9 he still would not accept the psychologists' interpretation of the
data. His majority opimon rejected the psychologists' finding that death-
qualified juries are significantly conviction-prone, and substituted his own
conclusion "that 'death qualification' in fact produces juries somewhat
more 'conviction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified' juries." 0 The Justices
then concluded that such a mimmally conviction-prone jury from which
biased death penalty opponents have been removed is not prosecution-biased
at all, as psychologists assert, but rather is impartial.s
The Court's opinion in Lockhart suggests that most Justices are hostile
towards social psychology, do not understand it, 2 believe that empirical
research on juror behavior is no more reliable than intuition and anecdotal
evidence, and ultimately believe that the science of psychology has little or
no place in the jurisprudence of trial procedure. These attitudes are reflected
in other cases as well. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, O'Connor and White
implied in Gray v. Mississippi 3 that the Court did not go far enough in
Lockhart when it criticized the empirical research on conviction-proneness.
They argued that the Court should not have admitted even a slight possibility
that the conviction-proneness studies might be valid, but rather should have
relied on its own intuitive conclusion that removing anti-death jurors "simply
does not result in juries . . tipped toward conviction."8 s4 In Ballew v
Georgia,5 Justice Powell stated that he had strong reservations about the
wisdom of basing Supreme Court decisions on empirical research even when
it supported his position, derisively referring to reliance on statistical lan-
guage as "numerology. 8s6 He even doubted the reliability of scientific
79. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 177-78. The Court argued that even if death-qualified juries were slightly biased
(which it did not concede), such a jury was still acceptable because it advanced the state's
"legitimate interest in obtaimng a single jury [for] both the guilt and sentencing phases
of a capital trial." Id. at 175-76. The Court also asserted as a justification that because the
appropriate sentence depends on the nature of the crime, some evidence would have to be
presented twice if two juries were used. Id. at 180-81. This is not true, of course. The two
juries could both be convened at the start of trial, and could sit together during the presentation
of evidence, after which the representative jury would decide guilt, and then, if the defendant
were convicted, the death-qualified jury would decide on the penalty. No evidence would have
to be presented twice.
82. It is impossible to say whether the inability of intelligent judges to understand social
science is genuine ignorance or contrived disingenuousness.
83. 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
84. Id. at 679.
85. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
86. Id. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring). WEBSTER'S UNABRIoED DmcToNARY (2d ed. 1975)
defines numerology as a "system of occultism built around numbers."
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research and the peer-review publication process, questiomng the psycho-
logical research because "neither the validity nor the methodology employed
by the studies cited was subjected to the traditional testing mechanism of
the adversary process [but] merely represent unexamined findings of
persons interested in the jury system." 87
To the extent that the Justices acknowledge the existence of empirical
research on juror behavior at all, they seem to consider it no more reliable
than their own intuition and experience. Most of the Justices do not appear
to believe that psychologists' training and expertise are of any particular
value. 8 Moreover, they do not distinguish science from nonscience, 9 and
are dubious of statistics. 90
The Court's nonuse of psychology transcends its usual liberal-conservative
political polarization. For example, Justices White, Rehnquist, O'Connor
and Burger, who are generally considered politically conservative, have
rejected studies showing that therapists cannot accurately predict the future
dangerousness of mental patients, 91 and have relied instead on their intuition
that such predictions can, in fact, be made.2 Justices Blackmun, Brennan
and Marshall, generally considered moderate to liberal, likewise have rejected
scientific data showing that hypnosis detrimentally affects memory accuracy,
and have relied instead on statements from an appellate opinion and a
police investigation manual about the benefits of hypnosis. 93 A unanimous
Court in Holbrook v Flynn rested its decision that a jury had not been
biased by seeing the defendant surrounded by armed security guards on
87 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 246 (Powell, J., concurrng). Powell's comment goes well beyond
the more ordinary claim that judges are in a poor position to independently distinguish good
science from bad science and therefore rely on the adversary system, especially cross-exanu-
nation, to reveal the truth. Cf. Walker & Monahan, supra note 7, at 583-85 (arguing that it
is inappropriate to subject scientific information, on which legal change will be based, to the
adversary fact process for exactly the same reason-the judge will not be in any better position
to judge good and bad science after an adversary battle of the experts).
88. Justice Powell will not even refer to psychologists as scientists, experts or professors,
but calls them "merely persons interested in the jury system." Ballew, 435 U.S. at 246
(Powell, J., concurrng).
89. See Gieryn, Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Nonscience: Strains
and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, 48 Am. Soc. Rnv 781 (1983); and Gieryn,
Bevins & Zehr, supra note 20, for a discussion and an empirical examnnation of the process
of distinguishing science from nonscience.
90. See Ballew, 435 U.S. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring) (equating reliance on statistics
with numerology). I suspect, though I cannot prove, that most Justices would agree with
Disraeli's opimon about the value of statistics ("There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned
lies, and statistics.").
91. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-99 (1983). The studies were presented to the
Court in a bnef filed by the American Psychiatric Association. Brief for Amicus Curiae
American Psychiatric Association, Barefoot, 463 U.S. 880 (No. 82-6080).
92. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896-99.
93. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 58-62 (1987).
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"[the Court's] own experience and common sense" and rejected a contrary
empirical, study.Y
Even when the Court concedes that there might be something credible to
empirical research on jury behavior, most Justices dismiss it as irrelevant
to a legal decision. Although they never say why psychology should not be
used as a jurisprudential principle, the Justices make the point repeatedly.
The message in Lockhart and other death penalty cases 95 is that even if the
Justices believed the conviction-proneness studies, they would nevertheless
approve the process of death-qualifying juries. In other cases, the Court
says that it will not re-examne its own precedents even if empirical research
demonstrates that their assumptions about juror behavior were probably
wrong. If precedent and psychology conflict, they will choose precedent as
the preferred basis for a decision. For example, in Barefoot v. Estelle, the
Court rejected scientific research because it was "contrary to [its own]
cases."9 In Ballew, Justice Blackmun stated that although empirical studies
cast doubt on their original decision to approve six-person juries, the Court
should "decline to reconsider" the issue.Y Justice Powell agreed, writing
that he did not see "the wisdom ... [or] the necessity" of relying on
statistics to make legal decisions. 9
The Court prefers precedent to science even when science could support
the Court's decision. For example, in Carter v. Kentucky,9 the Court
concluded that jurors will comply with an instruction against drawing
negative inferences from a defendant's failure to testify. The Justices relied
on precedent and their own intuitive assumptions that instructions must
have some effect, relegating supportive empirical studies to a footnote. °1
In Colgrove v. Battin, Justice Marshall argued in dissent that using smaller
juries in civil cases would produce greater variability of results and therefore
should not be permitted. He summarized the empirical data that supported
his position, but then expressly stated that he considered such data "ulti-
mately irrelevant to the constitutional issue."101
94. 475 U.S. 560, 571 n.4 (1986).
95. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 415 n.16 (1987) (refers to the Lockhart
Court's criticism of studies and its willingness to uphold death qualification even if studies
were sound).
96. 463 U.S. at 896-97 (rejecting research on reliability of psychiatrists' predictions of
dangerousness).
97. 435 U.S. at 231-32 n.10 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring).
99. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
100. Id. at 302-03. The Court ignored other empirical research that casts doubt on jurors'
abilities to follow this kind of limiting instruction. See Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of
Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED
Soc. PsYcn yOlO 345 (1973); Wolf & Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and
Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLmD
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 205 (1977).
101. 413 U.S. 149, 167 n.1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In some cases, Supreme Court Justices simply ignore empirical research.
In Watkins v Sowders, the majority concluded that hearings out of the
presence of the jury on the reliability of eyewitness identification are not
required. The opimon asserted that eyewitness testimony is no different
from any other kind of testimony, and that jurors will be able to accurately
assess its reliability 102 The majority made no reference whatsoever to the
psychological literature demonstrating both assumptions to be false, even
though Justice Brennan discussed it in some detail in his dissenting opin-
ion. 03 Subsequently, in United States v. Owens)1 4 the same research on
eyewitness testimony was cited and discussed in one of the briefs, but the
Justices ignored it completely The majority and dissent debated whether
an out-of-court statement of identification was sufficiently reliable to be
used in court, without ever discussing the massive body of psychological
research that had investigated the question. 05 Finally, in Wainwright v. Witt
the majority approved a more lement standard for removing anti-death
jurors,106 ignoring empirical research on conviction-proneness cited by the
dissent.
Even when empirical research could help the Court justify a decision, the
Justices have ignored it. In Gray,07 the Court held that mistakenly excusing
too many anti-death jurors is likely to have a significant impact on the
outcome of a trial. 08 The opinion never referred to the psychological
research confirming that such juries would be significantly conviction-prone,
even though the literature had been cited in one of the briefs and had been
hotly debated on the Court in each of the preceding two years.1°9
III. THEORIES ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND LAW
Theories on the interaction between social science and the law fall into
two general categories. Some predict that science will eventually assume a
promnnent role in legal policy-making. If courts are not now using social
science, it is because of particular obstacles that can be overcome. Other
102. 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981).
103. Id. at 349-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing E. LoFrus, supra note 51).
104. 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
105. Id. at 561 (statements of identification are just as reliable as other out-of-court
statements); id. at 566 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dangers of misidentification). There is a
certain irony here. In Ballew, 435 U.S. at 246, Justice Powell concluded that reliable scientific
research was untrustworthy because it was not subject to the traditional testing of the adversary
system (cross-exaimnation). Yet here, the court finds that unreliable eyewitness testimony is
sufficiently trustworthy that it can be exempted from the traditional testing mechamsm of
cross-examination.
106. 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985). This case was decided before the Lockhart Court's concession
that there might be some validity to the conviction-proneness studies.
107. 481 U.S. 648.
108. Id. at 663.
109. See Wainwright, 469 U.S. 412; Lockhart, 476 U.S. 162.
[Vol. 66:137
SUPREME COURT AND PSYCHOLOGY
theories posit that social science will not have much of an impact on the
law in the foreseeable future for a variety of reasons.
Theories predicting that the courts generally will use and rely on science
are of several different types. Robert Merton's theory of the sociology of
science asserts that modem Western culture as a whole has elevated science
to a prominent, often commanding position."10 Judges are products of their
culture and will therefore consciously or unconsciously incorporate social
science into their opinions. Other theories suggest that science will be used
instrumentally to bolster decisions reached on other grounds"' and to hide
the tyue political/ideological bases for those decisions," 2 at least to the
extent that social science is readily accessible to judges."' This is consistent
with neo-Marxist theory which views state reliance on science as a possible
solution to the inevitable legitimation crisis produced by government inter-
vention in economic processes." 4
None of these theories is confirmed. The Supreme Court has not
used readily available juror behavior research even when the data
could have legitimated the Court's decisions. In other contexts as
well, scholars have noticed that courts seem particularly averse to social
science, displaying hostility toward it, 1" 5 deriding the use of statistics, 1 6
dismissing empirical research as meaningless or infinitely malleable,"17
rejecting science as no more reliable than intuition,"18 or labeling science
110. See R. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 267 (1973); see also Lempert, "Between
Cup and Lip"" Social Science Influences on Law and Policy, 10 LAw & POL'Y 167, 183-85
(1988) (social science percolates into culture, indirectly affecting legal decisions).
iii. See M. SAKs & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 16; Lempert, supra note 110, at 184; but
cf. Fahr, Why Lawyers are Dissatisfied with the Social Sciences, 1 WA HBURN L.J. 161, 166
(1961).
112. See, e.g., M. SAKs & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 10; Fineman & Opie, supra note
32, at 110. Much of this theory as applied to law seems to be derived from Habermas'
philosophy. See, e.g., J. HAEmAss,-supra note 2, at 81-82, 85 (arguing that scientific rationality
allows those in power to stay dominant while appearing to be rational; the political character
of domination becomes unrecognizable).
113. See Tremper, Sangumity and Disillusionment Where Law Meets Social Science, II LAW
& Hum. BaHAv. 267, 272 (1987).
114. See J, HBBnmis, supra note 2, at 101-05; Stryker, supra note 19.
115. See M. SAKS & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 3; Tremper, supra note 113, at 274.
116. See P ROSEN, supra note 33, at 198-99; Dworkin, supra note 33, at 6; see also Maxwell
v. Bishop, 257 F Supp. 710, 720 (E.D. Ark. 1966) ("The Court doubts that [racial]
discrimination, which is a highly subjective matter, can be detected accurately by a statistical
analysis .. Statistics are elusive things at best, and it is a truism that almost anything can
be proved by them."), aff'd, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 398
U.S. 262 (1970); M. SAKs & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 75 (quoting well-respected law
Professor Stephen Breyer as stating that he could produce a scientist to testify in favor of any
position).
117. See M. SAKS & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 10-11.
118. See M. SAKS & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 16; Gieryn, Bevins & Zehr, supra note
20, at 396. Gieryn, Bevms and Zehr provide an excellent historical illustration of this symptom.
In the Scopes trial, a schoolteacher was charged with violating a law prohibiting teaching
evolution mconsistent with the Biblical account of creation. The defense sought to call expert
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as evil.' 1 9
The question on which no consensus has been reached is why courts are
reluctant to rely on empirical research. Theories that have been propounded
offer a variety of possible explanations: (1) the political disjunction theory
says judges are conservative and perceive social scientists to be liberal, (2)
the conceit theory holds judges are conceited and do not believe they need
any assistance from non-lawyers, (3) the human nature theory says judges
are human, and it is human nature to be unscientific, (4) the ignorance
hypothesis is that judges are ignorant of, inexperienced with, or do not
understand empincal social science, (5) the threat theory holds judges
perceive science as a threat to their power and prestige and (6) the rival-
systems theory argues that law and social science are rival systems with
competing logics.
The political disjunction theory holds that law is conservative and social
science is liberal. The theory's proponents suggest that judges are predom-
inantly politically conservative, and that the legal system based on stare
decisis and precedent is also conservative. 20 In contrast, social science
comprises disciplines committed to innovation, progress and change.12' This
difference in approach leads to distrust. Judges may conceive of psycholo-
gists as only pretending to be neutral while really favoring criminal
defendants'2 and promoting hidden agendas of social change.'T I Hence
witnesses to explain to the jury exactly what the theory of evolution was, and that it was m
fact consistent with much of the account of creation contained in Genesis. The judge ruled
such evidence irrelevant on the grounds that the judge and jury could understand evolution
just as well as scientists, and therefore did not need scientists to explain it to them. See also
Fineman & Opie, supra note 32, at 110, 124-30 (a radical law professor asserts that her
personal interpretation of social science data is just as valid as the scientists').
119. See J. BRoNowsKI, ScIENCE AND HumA VALUES 54 (rev. ed. 1965); Gieryn, Bevms &
Zehr, supra note 20, at 395. For example, Judge David Bazelon has written that scientists
often come to court with hidden agendas and often "fail to come clean" (that is, lie under
oath) in their testimony. Bazelon, Veils, Values, and Social Responsibility, 37 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST
115, 115-17 (1982). Bronowski argues on a more philosophical level that social science is viewed
as evil because it reveals what people do, rather than what they ought to do. What they do
is often wicked. He argues that the righteous believe that the wicked flourish and become
successful, so that if social scientists study what does or does not "work" within our wicked
social framework, then it is studying (and promulgating) evil. J. BRONOWSKI, supra, at 54.
120. Haney, Psychology and Legal Change: On the Limits of a Factual Jurisprudence, 4
LAW & HuM. BEHAv 147, 159-60 (1980).
121. See P ROSEN, supra note 33, at 198-99; M. SAKS & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 3,
10-11.
122. Loh, The Evidence and Trial Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRit=
PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 35-36. Of course, on the most general level, science is not
"neutral." It will be influenced in what it studies, when it considers that a consensus has been
reached and how results are interpreted m light of prevailing biases and theories. See T. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIC REvOLUTIONs 5-7 (2d ed. 1970). At the other end of the
spectrum, individual scientists may misinterpret results because of personal biases. However,
science as a whole, through the peer-review publication process and the ideology of objectivity
and consensus, tends to elimnate the kind of extreme biases the judges are worried about.
Science obviously will reflect some of the same cultural norms that law also reflects, but this
is not the kind of bias feared by judges.
123. Bazelon, supra note 119, at 115-17
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judges may believe that the results of empircal research are unreliable
because they have been distorted by the scientists' liberal values.'2
There are four problems with the political disjunction hypothesis. First,
judges are not all alike. They are not likely to umversally adhere to any
one political philosophy. 12 Second, analysis of the Supreme Court's trial
process cases reveals that the most liberal Justices, Brennan and" Marshall,
showed no greater tendency to rely on science than their conservative
colleagues. 12 Third, even when the Justices wrote opinions specifically
advocating changes in tnal procedure, they did not rely on social science.
Fourth, the hypothesis leads to the conclusion that social science will never
be welcomed into the legal process. It therefore does not account for
situations in which social scientists are allowed to play a major role in the
law, for example, as expert witnesses. 127
The conceit theory suggests that judges shun social science not out of
distrust, but out of conceit. They conceive of law as an autonomous, self-
contained discipline. l 8 Judges may believe it unnecessary, and perhaps even
inappropriate to consult anything but the law itself for answers to legal
questions.1 29 A good example of this attitude is Justice Felix Frankfurter's
statement: "I do not care what any . . professor in sociology tells me."' 30
Although a theory based on the conceit of lawyers is tempting, it is, alas,
a tautology It fails to answer why judges think the law is self-contained
and needs no assistance from social science.
The human nature theory holds that judges are human, and it is just
human nature to be illogical and unscientific. Social psychologists have
124. P Rosin, supra note 33, at 199. Conversely, judges may view economic analysis as
reliable because of political congeniality, see Collins, The Use of Social Research in the Courts,
in KNOWLEDGE AND Poucy: THE UN CERTAIN CoNNrcioN 147 (L. Lynn ed. 1978), or have
more faith in data gathered by government agencies such as the census bureau. See Mississippi
Umv. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (accepting government statistical data).
125. See G. SCHUBERT, THE JuDiciAL MInD REVISrrED (1974); see also Rowland, Songer &
Carp, Presidential Effects on Criminal Justice Policy in the Lower Federal Courts: The Reagan
Judges, 22 LAw & Soc' REv 191, 196-97 (1988) (study of federal appellate decisions showed
that in split decision criminal cases, Reagan appointees voted for the defendant at only a 14%
rate, while Carter appointees voted for defendants at a 67% rate).
126. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text; see also Haney, supra note 120, at 153
(psychology is commonly used by lawyers to resolve disputes about the insanity defense and
to help improve courtroom performance).
128. See Posner, Essays Commemorating the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Harvard
Law Review: The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV L.
REV 761, 762-66 (1987) (suggesting that this attitude is breaking down with respect to
economics).
129. See M. SAKs & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 120; Tremper, supra note 113, at 272.
130. ARGUmENT 65 (L. Friedman ed. 1969), quoted in M. SAKs & C. BARON, supra note
19, at 13, 16. Frankfurter's attitude has been described as "if a proposition is true, I don't
need sociologists to tell me that it is true." A. D'AmATo, R. METRAMER & S. WASBY,
DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER: AN EXPLORATION OF SUPREME COURT STRATEGOIS,
73-74 (1977), quoted in M. SAKs & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 16.
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demonstrated that people generally tend to undervalue social science data,,"
misunderstand and under-utilize statistics,3 2 rely on anecdotes and emotion
rather than empirical and scientific evidence when making important
decisions 3 and persistently hold beliefs contrary to logic and mathematics. 3 4
Merton asserts that this under-utilization of science arises from the natural
incompatibility between the scientific ethos and the sentiments essential to,
and taught by, other social institutions 3 such as religion. Indeed, from
Galileo's retraction of his Dialogue on the Great World Systems in 1633,
to the present debates on teaching evolution and "creation-science," religion
and science have stood in opposition. 136 Yet this thesis, too, is tautological.
It merely recognizes that most individuals will reject scientific expertise when
making some kinds of decisions. It is not helpful in understanding why
judges think psychology is less reliable than their own beliefs about juror
behavior.
The ignorance- hypothesis holds that judges, despite a generally high level
of education and intelligence, are inexperienced with, and do not understand
empirical social science, especially its statistical language. 137 This ignorance
makes it difficult for judges to distinguish between public opinion polls and
empirical research on human behavior, '3 or between social science and
social ideology.139 In the case of psychology, the problem may be com-
pounded by judges confusing experimental psychology with clinical psy-
chology and psychiatry. An article written by Professor Samuel Fahr offers
a good illustration of a lawyer's failure to distinguish these two fields. In
the course of explaimng why lawyers distrust social scientists, he illustrates
one of his points by stating that no two psychiatrists can agree on a question
of mental illness.4 If judges tink that all psychology is climcal, they will
be unlikely to distinguish experimental method and probabilistic conclusions
from clinical method and diagnostic guessing. '4 1
131. See Saks & Kidd, supra note 66, at 149.
132. See Thompson & Schumann, supra note 66.
133. See R. NiSBETT & L. Ross, supra note 66, at 55-56.
134. See Saks & Kidd, supra note 66, at 127-31. A common example is the gambler's fallacy
that a coin is more likely to land head up on the next toss if it has landed tail up several
times in a row, on the ground that such a result is overdue. See also Thompson & Schumann,
supra note 66 (discussing more complicated fallacies).
135. R. MERTON, supra note 110, at 254-55.
136. See Gieryn, Bevins & Zehr, supra note 20, at 395.
137 M. SAKS & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 15, 44.
138. See M. SAxs & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 119.
139. See P ROSEN, supra note 33, at 199.
140. Fahr, supra note 11i, at 168; see also Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the
Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61
VA. L. Rav 1187 (1975), in which they, too, confuse science with psychiatry. They illustrate
their claim that judges do not understand social and behavioral science, by quoting a statement
by Judge Jerome Frank that judges are ill-equipped to deal with psychiatry. Id. at 1211.
141. See McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the
Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REv 19,
25 (1987).
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The ignorance hypothesis is at best only a partial explanation. It does
not explain why in some situations the Justices actually do accept and rely
on social science. For example, they have been willing to learn and apply
rudimentary economics to antitrust law, 42 and to incorporate sociology and
statistical analysis into discrimnation cases.143 The theory also does not
explain why the Court continues to exhibit the same apparent scientific
ignorance in the fourth or fifth case in a series of cases involving the same
scientific studies. For example, between 1985 and 1987, the Supreme Court
decided four cases involving the issue of whether death-qualified juries were
conviction-prone.144 The Court did not demonstrate any greater appreciation
for the empirical research on conviction-proneness in the final case than it
had shown in the first. The Court not only decided every case contrary to
the psychological studies, but by the final case in the series was not even
discussing the social science data. 145 A similar pattern is visible in the series
of cases on jury size. The Court's final opinion in that series was no more
enlightened than the first.'4
The threat theory argues that judges view science as a threat to their
power and prestige. In the legal system, people with legal training have
traditionally occupied the high status positions. If the law were to become
dependenf on science for answers to legal questions, the role of those with
legal training would be diminished. Eventually, scientific techniques alien
to lawyers might replace the familiar dialectic of law as the basis for
decisions. 47 This specter would threaten the current distribution of power 4s
142. See Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 54-58 (1977); see also Collins,
supra note 124, at 147.
143. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 729 (incorporating statistics in
deciding whether a nursing school discrmunated against men); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482 (1976) (statistical analysis of whether the grand jury selection process discriminated against
Hispanics); see also D. BALDuS & J. CoLE, STATisTcAL PROOF OF DISCRIMNATION (1980)
(general textbook on. the uses of social science and statistics at all levels of litigation to
establish discrimination).
144. See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648
(1987); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt; 469 U.S. 412, cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1039 (1985). The issue had first been raised in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968).
145. Buchanan, 483 U.S. 402 (1987).
146. The question of jury size and unanimity has been presented in several cases. Burch v.
Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149 (1973); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); see also M. SAKS & C. BARON,
supra note 19, at 119 (Stuart Nagel's complaints that the Court seemed to learn nothing from
the data).
147. See Loevinger, Law and Science as Rival Systems, 8 JuRMamics J. 63, 70 (1966);
McCord, supra note 141, at 25 n.16.
148. See J. BRONOWSKI, supra note 119, at 55; R. MERTON, supra note 110, at 277-78.
Studies of adrminstrative agencies have found that agency lawyers and scientists constitute
organizational interest groups, each jockeying to maximize their power and the authoritativeness
of their expertise in agency decision-making. Stryker, supra note 19.
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in which judges can take advantage of the malleability of legal reasoning
to fashion decisions as they see fit.149 Like the other theories, however, this
one is unable to account for those situations in which the courts have based
decisions on economics and social science.
Rival-systems theory holds that law and science are incompatible systems
with fundamentally different logics1 50 Like people from different cultures,
lawyers and social scientists may have such different professional values
that they simply cannot commumcate effectively with each other. Thomas
Kuhn, for example, implies that science is rational, but that law is by nature
irrational.15 1 Others have argued that science focuses on generalities and law
on the individual, 152 or that social science is passive but law is dynamic. 3
Steven Goldberg has described science as non-utilitanan and focused on
goals, and law as utilitarian and focused on process. 54 Craig Haney provides
the most detailed explication of the rival-systems theory. He sets up a series
of contrasting characteristics that distinguish social sciences like psychology
from law- (1) social science is innovative, while law resists innovation, (2)
social science is based on data and observation, while law is based on
precedent and hierarchy, (3) social science seeks an objective answer to
problems, while law seeks an adversarial victory, (4) social science is
descriptive, while law is prescriptive, (5) social science is nomothetic, while
law is idiographic, (6) social science conclusions are probabilistic and ten-
tative, while legal conclusions are irrevocable and must appear certain, (7)
social science is proactive, while law is reactive, and (8) social science is
abstract, while law deals with concrete issues.is
In this form, rival-systems theory assumes that all social sciences are alike
and all areas of law are sufficiently similar that courts will always reject
social science. Yet the reality is clearly otherwise. Although the psychology
of juror behavior has been ignored by the courts, other fields of social
science have found a place in other areas of the law, like labor law i16
149. See Cahn, supra note 33, at 157-68; cf. Dworkin, supra note 33, at 4-5 (pointing out
that judges will always have to exercise moral judgment).
150. See Loevinger, supra note 147, at 70.
151. T. KuHN, supra note 122, at 19. But see M. WEBER, THE THEoRY oF SociAL AND
EcoNoMc ORoANiZATioN 328-39 (T. Parsons ed. 1947) (law is rational in the sense that it
depends on rules and their application according to appropriate procedures, regardless of the
ends served).
152. See Fahr, supra note 111, at 162-63.
153. See Collins, supra note 124, at 145; see also Haney, supra note 120, at 166-67 (the
law is reactive, while psychology is proactive).
154. Goldberg, The Reluctant- Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEo. L.J. 1341,
1344-45 (1987). But cf. J. HABERmAS, supra note 2, at 81-85 (treating science and its utilitarian
form, technology, as having the same impact on society and politics).
155. Haney, supra note 120, at 159-68. In my opimon, Haney is wrong about some of his
descnptions of the law, at least with respect to the characteristics of trials.
156. See Ellsworth & Getman, supra note 31, at 610-20 (comparing labor law to criminal
law); Stryker, supra note 19 (describing the role of social science in labor law from the original
Brandeis brief in 1908 to economic justification of the National Labor Relations Act).
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Rival-systems theory fails to recognize that different areas of law may reflect
significantly different public policies, employ different procedures, be based
on different logics and further different-even competing--goals."' 7
If we eschew trying to develop a single metatheory to explain all social
science and all legal decision-making, rival-systems theory nught become a
more useful tool. It suggests that we examine which areas of law share
values with fields of social science and which do not. It predicts that the
less compatible the two systems are, the less likely it is that legal decision-
makers will incorporate social science information into their decisions. The
Court's failure to accord any role to psychology in its trial law decisions
may be due to their fundamentally incompatible normative systems.
IV. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF PSYCHOLOGY WITH THE SUPREME
COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE OF TRIALS
Ronald Dworkin points out that empirical research can answer questions
of causation but not of right and wrong.' 8 For example, psychology can
demonstrate that death-qualifying a jury will result in more convictions,' 5 9
but cannot answer the policy question whether an increase in the conviction
rate in capital cases is desirable or undesirable. 60 The comparative-normative
approach proposed above suggests that the Supreme Court will perceive a
branch of social science to be relevant to the formation of legal policy only
if the science reflects some of the same values being advanced by the law.
The more the two value systems converge, the more completely the Court's
jurisprudence will incorporate social-scientific information. The more the
values diverge, the greater will be the tendency of the Justices to reject the
science. In the case of trial procedures, the Court has totally denied
psychology any role in the formation of policy. This aversion suggests that
the values the Court believes are important to proper trials are imnmical to
the value structure of psychology
A. The Normative Structure of Psychology
The basic normative structure of experimental psychology is generally
conceded. Like other sciences, psychology's organizing principle is the
157. For example, one of the goals of criminal law may be to impnson a greater number
of crimnals for longer periods of time, while one of the goals of tax law may be to reduce
expenditures on the cnrminal justice system.
158. Dworkin, supra note 33, at 4-6.
159. See Lockhart Brief, supra note 17, at 3.
160. See P RosEN, supra note 33, at 225 (social science cannot answer questions of values).
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pursuit of truth. In addition, psychology values universality, community,
disinterestedness, skepticism and progressiveness. 16'
If there is a single dominant principle in empirical psychology, it is that
the goal of the scientific enterprise is to learn the truth. 62 The scientific
notion of truth has three distinctive characteristics. First, scientific truth is
tentative. Knowledge claims in science are seldom final and undergo constant
revision.16 Truth is not established by a single experiment, but by replication,
debate and competition among segments of the scientific community that
lead eventually to consensus. 64 Second, scientific truth is verifiable, or at
least falsifiable. Empirical evidence may confirm or disprove scientific
theories and claims. 6 Third, scientific truth usually is probabilistic. Its
conclusions are expressed in statistical probabilities.'6
Science also values universality. 67 Research is in principle independent of
national boundaries, and does not depend on the race, nationality, sex,
religion or social class of the scientists. This universality frees science from
many political restraints. Scientific research can neither be invalidated by
political decree nor changed by governments. 68
The third principle of science is that it is supposed to be communistic.
69
Scientific findings are, in theory, common property owned by no one and
available to all. Scientific knowledge is advanced collectively, conflicts with
the capitalist definition of technology as private property and is arrived at
by consensus.
Science also values disinterestedness. 70 Science is concerned with the
advancement of knowledge generally, regardless of whether any group, other
161. Some other pnnciples have been put forward as being fundamental to science, but
their validity is dubious. Merton asserts that science is politically neutral. Compare R. MERTON,
supra note 110, at 270-73 with T. KurHn, supra note 122, at 23-34 (normal science reflects
paradigms consistent with the status quo). Bronowski argues that scientists are virtuous, and
do not make wild claims, cheat, try to persuade at any cost, hide their ignorance or discriminate
based on race, sex or where one attended graduate school. J. BRONOWSKI, supra note 119, at
59. Collins says that social science is passive (merely observes) rather than actively trying to
solve problems. Collins, supra note 124, at 145.
162. But cf. T. Kum4, supra note 122, at 5-24 (arguing that most scientists do not seek
truth, but seek to verify the accepted scientific paradigms of their disciplines-to force nature
into conceptual boxes supplied by prevailing theories).
163. J, BRONOWSKI, supra note 119, at 37, 45, 63; Gieryn, Bevins & Zehr, supra note 20,
at 396-97; Haney, supra note 120, at 165-66, 184.
164. T. KurN, supra note 122, at 8.
165. Gieryn, Bevins & Zehr, supra note 20, at 400; see Goldberg, supra note 154, at 1345-
46.
166. Haney, supra note 120i at 165-66.
167. R. MERTON, supra note 110, at 270-73.
168. Cf. T. KuHN, supra note 122, at 5 (pointing out that umversalism does not mean that
science is nonpolitical and value-neutral; science reflects the status quo as learned in graduate
school); see also Fineman & Opie, supra note 32, at 110-11 (much research arises from and
incorporates the political positions of the social scientists who undertake it).
169. R. MERTON, supra note 110, at 273-75.
170. Id. at 275-77 Merton asserts that science is disinterested, but obviously means it stnves
for disinterestedness.
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than science itself, benefits from it. Although individual scientists may be
motivated by personal interests m fame, fortune, funding or politics, 171 these
interests are largely filtered out by institutionalized procedures that reason-
ably assure objectivity and unbiased interpretation of data.172
The scientific method of hypothesis testing reflects the value science places
on skepticism. 173 Social scientists are skeptical of the assumptions underlying
social institutions. They ask questions of fact concerning society and human
behavior when other social institutions have already ritualized certain an-
swers that may or may not be empirically valid. Social science, therefore,
threatens the curient distribution of power. 74
Finally, social science values innovation and progress. Psychology is
progressive in the sense that it is never satisfied with the current state of
understanding about human behavior. Psychology is therefore associated
with change, rather than preservation of the status quo. 75
B. The Normative Structure of Trials
There is considerably less agreement on the basic norms of the trial
system. A few writers have suggested that trials serve only one purpose-
to determine the truth about a dispute.176 However, this simplistic notion
cannot survive serious scrutiny. Scholars who study the American trial
system describe a far more complex normative structure comprising some
or all of five conflicting values: "adversanness," institutional efficiency,
legal accuracy, social symbolism and preservation of order.
The basic organizing principle of the trial system is its adversarial struc-
ture. There are lawyers on each side of a case, who are charged, not with
assisting in the deternunation of truth, but with advancing their clients'
individual interests, regardless of the merits. 77 While many have criticized
this "sporting contest" approach,178 no one disagrees that it is the predom-
inant characteristic of American trials.179
171. See T. Kumi, supra note 122.
172. Gieryn, Bevmis & Zehr, supra note 20, at 403.
173. R. MERTON, supra note 110, at 277-78.
174. J. BRONOWSKi, supra note 119, at 55, 60-61; cf. T. Kum4, supra note 122, at 24, 36
(arguing persuasively that most scientists are not very skeptical, but practice "normal" science,
which consists of solving small puzzles within the currently accepted scientific paradigms, and
do not often challenge prevailing theories).
175. Gieryn, Bevins & Zehr, supra note 20, at 397; Haney, supra note 120, at 159.
176. See, e.g., Meese, Promoting Truth in the Courtroom, 40 VAuN. L. Ray. 271 (1987);
Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judiial Trials, 66
COLTJM. L. Rnv. 223 (1966).
177. See Belsky, The Retaliation Doctrine: Promoting Forensic Misconduct, 50 ALB. L.
Rnv. 763, 767 (1986).
178. See M. FRANKEL, PARTisAN JUSTICE 11-12 (1980); Gerber, Victory vs. Truth: The
Adversary System and Its Ethics, 19 ARiz. ST. L.J. 3, 4 (1987); Williams, Advance Notice of
the Defence, 1959 Ciau. L. Ray. 548, 554.
179. See Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRm.
L. & CRanNoLoay 118 (1987); Weinstein, supra note 176, at 225.
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The Supreme Court's trial decisions are rife with evidence of the value
placed on preserving adversanness. In Strickland v Washington, Justice
O'Connor stated that "a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to
adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution."'' 10
In United States v Havens, the Court said that it is "essential . . to the
proper functioning of the adversary system that [the state] be permitted
proper and effective cross-examination."'' In Ohio v Roberts, Justice
Blackmun stated his belief that adversarial confrontation between accuser
and accused is "so important" that it is essential to the "ultimate integrity"
of the trial process. 82 In United States v. Young, the Court even. used a
sporting contest metaphor: "[The adversary system permits.. hard blows
[but not] foul ones.. [Iln the heat of argument hard blows cannot
be avoided [although this is] not intended by any means to encourage the
practice of zealous counsel's going 'out of bounds." ' 3
The adversarial emphasis is sometimes defended on the ground that
adversarial procedures will somehow result in the discovery of truth,1'4 but
most scholars point out that this is mere wishful thinking at best.185 The
adversarial system in fact encourages lawyers to conceal and suppress
damaging information, to exaggerate the significance of favorable evidence
and to try to deceive the jury about the importance of facts or the way the
law works. 86 This clearly conflicts with scientific method, but to the Court,
adversanness is paramount. Thus, the Court may reject empirical research
that has not been "subjected to the traditional testing mechanism of the
adversary process,"' 7 or denigrate scientific consensus with the remark that
if scientific knowledge were really correct, then it would prevail in the
adversary system. 8
The second important trial norm is institutional efficiency. Trial resources
are limited and many litigants want access to them. Therefore, the legal
system must allocate those resources efficiently among disputants. 8 9 Policies
180. 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
181. 446 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1980).
182. 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980).
183. 470 U.S. 1, 7-13 (1985).
184. E.g., Fuller & Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference,
44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958); Goldberg, supra note 154, at 1349.
185. See Goodpaster, supra note 179, at 121-24; Gross, The American Advantage: The
Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. Rnv 734, 742-44 (1987); see also Lind, The
Psychology of Courtroom Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF nE CoturRooM, supra note 5,
at 21-22 (summarizing empircal evidence and concluding that the adversarial structure does
not lead to reliable, accurate verdicts).
186. See Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion
Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C.L. Rnv 481, 483-86 (1987).
187. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (presumably
referring to the lack of opportunity for lawyers to cross-examine the scientists).
188. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 900-01 (1983).
189. Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
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that favor finality and limit appeals and retnals advance this objective. 9°
In addition, maintenance of a hierarchical system among judges, in which
discretion is granted to lower court judges and the power of appellate judges
to intervene is limited, aids efficiency 191 Efficiency concerns are of.growing
significance in Supreme Court trial law decisions. 192 For example, in Engle
v. Isaac93 and United States v Frady,1 94 companion cases raising claims of
improper trial procedures, Justice O'Connor's majority opinions make six-
teen references to the need for efficiency, 95 compared to two references to
the need for accurate, reliable results. 19 In Morris v. Slappy, the Court
rejected a claim that a defendant's lawyer should have been given more
time to prepare, justifying the decision by referring to the importance of
trial schedules, the convenience of witnesses and the importance of the
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 199-200 (1983). It also could be argued that
because of the disparity of resources between parties, trials must be reasonably efficient so
they remain affordable to the average disputant. This seems a dubious proposition at best.
Gross argues that it is not only dubious, but socially counterproductive, because efficient
individual trials may not be accurate, and inefficiency deters needless litigation and promotes
settlement. Gross, supra note 185, at 740, 748-56.
190. See Pulaski, Criminal Trials: A "Search for Truth" or Something Else?, 16 CayM. L.
BuLL. 41, 41-42 (1980).
191. See Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DuKE L.J. 747, 750-64; Rosenberg, Judicial
Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRAcusE L. R'v. 635, 660-65 (1971).
192. At least the rhetoric of efficiency is increasing. In criminal cases that reach the Supreme
Court, it is always more efficient to uphold a conviction rather than award a new trial. It is
therefore difficult to distinguish genuine concern for efficiency from general anti-defendant
bias. There is some reason to believe that efficiency is being touted merely to legitimize
conservative anti-defendant decisions. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 180-81 (1986)
(one reason given for approving the use of conviction-prone juries was the inefficiency of
presenting evidence twice to two juries; the Court iguored the fact that the two juries could
have sat together, so that evidence would only have to be presented once). There is also
evidence that the Justices' desire for efficiency is genuine. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231, 234 n.1 (1980) (holding that the state was barred from asserting a claim on appeal because
of a procedural default).
193. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
194. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
195. Engle, 456 U.S. at 126-29, 134 ("The writ of habeas corpus entails significant
costs [and] extends the ordeal [of a crinal trial for] society [S]ociety [has]
an interest in the certainty that comes with an end to litigation [T]he writ undernmnes
the usual principles of finality [S]ociety's resources [should be concentrated] at one time
and place in order to decide guilt or innocence .[The] passage of time may
render retrial difficult, even impossible. [T]he Great Writ imposes special costs on our
federal system [which are] particularly lugh when a trial default has [occurred]. [A]
habeas writ . exacts an extra charge The costs do not depend upon the type of
claim . mhe demand of comity and finality counsel against [habeas]."); Frady, 456 U.S.
at 163-66 (1982) ("[A]ll trial participants [must] seek a fair and accurate trial the first time
around . [S]ociety [has a] legitimate interest in the finality of the judgment [and
cannot allow] a series of endless postconviction collateral attacks [A] final judgment
commands respect . Mhe Federal Government has an interest in the finality of-its
criminal judgments.").




prompt administration of justice. 97 Similarly, in United States v Valenzuela-
Bernal, the Court approved the government's deporting eyewitnesses just
before trial, justifying depriving the defendant of evidence on the grounds
that detaining illegal aliens would impose financial and physical burdens on
the government. 98 The Court has also justified the use of biased juries in
capital cases because of the trial court's difficult job and heavy workload,
the inefficiency of conducting two trials, the need to save time and the
burdens placed on the system by defendants who appeal.' 99
The principle of efficiency is not very important to psychological re-
search. 200 Psychologists are not expected to arrive at an irrevocable conclu-
sion after only a single experiment. The results of individual expenments
are not accorded a presumption of finality, but are always open to challenge
and invalidation. In psychology, review, duplication and replication of
experiments are an integral part of the process of reaching conclusions.
The Supreme Court sometimes rejects psychological research in the name
of efficiency 201 In Lockhart v McCree, the Court rejected the empirical
research on the conviction-proneness of death-qualified juries because cor-
recting the problem would require the inefficient use of two juries or
repetitive trials.= Research demonstrating that jurors might be unable to
follow instructions on disregarding improper evidence has likewise been
rejected 2°s because ordering new trials after every instance of improper use
of evidence would overwhelm the system.
The third jurisprudential value of trials is legal accuracy, often simplis-
tically referred to as "truth." 204 The Supreme Court has written that "the
normally predominant principle [is that] of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaimng truth"; 2 5 the law's mission is to "advance the accuracy of the
197 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 14-15 (1983). Chief Justice Burger wrote: "Trial
judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling tnals[,] assembling the
witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place and [at the same] time repeated
trials place[ burdens on the system in terms of witnesses, records, and judicial
resources." See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507 (1983) (expressing similar
concerns).
198. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 865 (1982).
199. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 180-81.
200. Obviously, individual psychologists have to conduct their experiments with some degree
of efficiency if they are to obtain grants and satisfy publication requirements for promotion
and tenure. Other psychologists no doubt are efficient by nature. However, psychology as a
discipline is not obsessed with efficiency as an end in itself.
201. The Court's stated preference to submit accepted scientific conclusions to pointless
adversarial testing is, of course, grossly inefficient. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 7, at
588-98. However, it is not uncommon for the Court to have to choose between conflicting
values.
202. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175-76, 180-81.
203. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303 (1981).
204. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the
Law of Evidence, 58 U. CoLo. L. Rav 1, 2-5 (1986); Saks & Kidd, supra note 66, at 123-25.
205. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980).
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truth-deterimng process in criminal trials";2 "arriving at the truth is a
fundamental goal of our legal system"; 207 trials are a 'truth-determining
process.'; 201 and the law should "augment accuracy in the fact-finding
process." 20 The Court has referred to the need for full disclosure of evidence
as grounds for limiting testimonial privileges, calling such privileges inde-
fensible obstructions to the truth.210 Recently, even the scope of constitu-
tionally based exclusionary rules has been restricted in the name of eliciting
the truth.21'
The problem with using the word "truth" in the trial context is that it
is latently ambiguous. What actually happened in the past is not empirically
discoverable through the use of fallible witnesses under procedural rules
that may exclude relevant testimony.212 Juries are not asked to determne
purely factual issues, rather they must apply facts to law and make judg-
ments about culpability. 213 And, juries must reach legally binding decisions
even if they have no idea what really happened because the evidence is
weak, contradictory or confusing. With all of these constraints, the best
the system can hope for is that trials will result in an approximation of
factual truth.2 4 In other words, trials are concerned with proof-whether
the parties can satisfy the rules of a closed system-and not with whether
juries can determine the actual truth.215 Therefore, it is more precise to say
that the trial system values legally accurate verdicts than thatit values truth.
206. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985).
207. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980).
208. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986) (quoting Street, 471 U.S. at 415).
209. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980); ef. Frady, 456 U.S. at 163 (Justice O'Connor
asserts that accuracy is important because it is more efficient than having to try the case a
second time).
210. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52.
211. Havens, 446 U.S. at 626-27; Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980). Whether
the Court takes its own rhetoric seriously or just uses it to legitimate its decisions is a matter
of debate. In virtually every instance where the Court emphasizes the need for full evidence
in order to promote truth-seeking and accurate verdicts, its ruling permits evidence to be
introduced that will help convict the defendant. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish truth-
seeking from anti-defendant bias in many cases. For example, the Supreme Court has eliminated
several testimonial privileges so that witnesses could testify against an accused defendant in
the name of truth-seeking, see, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. 40; United States v. Gillock, 445
U.S. 360 (1980), but in the one case presenting a privilege that favored corporate interests, it
was expanded, without mention of the need to determine truth. Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383 (1981).
212. Loh, supra note 122, at 16-18; see Leonard, supra note 204, at 25-31 (analyzing rules
of character evidence and concluding they do not advance truth-seeking). Nevertheless, one of
the pervasive myths of the tnal system is that the rules of evidence are designed primarily to
aid the reliability of the jury's verdict by protecting jurors from evidence that might distract
them or prejudice one of the parties. Even some legal scholars still cling to this notion. See
Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 Omo ST. L.J.
713, 716 (1983).
213. See Arenella, supra note 189, at 197-99.
214. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 178, at 73; Weinstein, supra note 176, at 229.
215. See M. SAns & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 45.
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Although the trial's goal of legal accuracy and psychology's search for
empirical accuracy are similar concepts, they are not interchangeable. First,
scientific method requires that complete data be gathered, 2 6 and that all
data be accounted for. Trials, on the other hand, rely on incomplete data
gathered by biased investigators, operate according to procedural rules that
exclude entire categories of information and permit juries to disregard what
little evidence is introduced. Second, erroneous conclusions by scientists
probably will be exposed by subsequent research. Erroneous decisions by
juries cannot be detected because no further investigation and research is
permitted. The only review of a jury's decision is limited to whether the
factual conclusions are supported by some evidence, and whether the deci-
sion was arrived at through a correct understanding of the law. Third, the
conclusions reached in trials are individualistic and need not be consistent,
while those reached by psychology are probabilistic and general, based on
consistent results from several experiments. 2 7 Thus, the scientific paradigm
envisions a single truth discovered after several experiments, and subject to
later revision. The litigation paradigm hopes that the facts will point to a
single truth, but recognizes that often the jury may justifiably reach any
one of several decisions, none of which is subject to revision. 21
The fourth element of the normative structure of trials is social symbolism.
The trial system is one of the most visible American legal institutions. Thus,
it is important that trials reinforce aspects of prevailing ideology. Trials are
said to symbolize the importance of individual autonomy2 19 and government
respect for individual rights. 220 The prominence of the jury is often said to
216. In many instances, complete data on human behavior cannot be gathered, in which
case a smaller sample may be used, as long as it can be demonstrated that the sample is
representative of the umverse of subjects. The quintessential characteristic of a valid sampling
technique is that it must not be biased.
217. For example, if psychologists demonstrate that 99 out of 100 death-qualified juries will
be conviction-prone, the lawyers in any capital case can argue that theirs is the one exception.
See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 171-72 (Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that social science can be
ignored because it cannot tell us with certainty what the jury's verdict would be in any
particular case); see also Stryker, supra note 19, for further discussion of the difference between
scientific and legal rationality.
218. A good example is the Texas case involving Lionell Geter, mistakenly identified as a
robber. Even after the case was profiled on the CBS program Sixty Minutes, and it was
apparent that Geter had been mistakenly identified and was factually innocent, he remained
m jail. The state had presented its proof at trial, the defendant had presented his alibi witnesses
and the jury had sided with the state. Therefore, a legally correct, but factually wrong, verdict,
supported by evidence and decided by law, had been reached. Because the verdict was legally
proper, it was very difficult to undo. Geter was held in prison for almost two years after his
true innocence was known. The case is summarized in L. Waionmsi.N, supra note 23, at 103-
04.
219. See Arenella, supra note 189, at 197-99. But see Gross, supra note 185, at 744-47
(expressing doubts that the adversarial structure symbolizes individual autonomy).
220. See Terrell, Rights and Wrongs in the Rush to Repose: On the Jurisprudential Dangers
of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 36 EMORY L.J. 541, 545-46 (1987).
[Vol. 66:137
SUPREME COURT AND PSYCHOLOGY
symbolize democratic ideals?'2l In the jury size cases, for example, the
Supreme Court discusses the symbolic importance of the jury as the dem-
ocratic bulwark against government oppression.2m In other cases, the Justices
mention the contemporary symbolic importance of including blacks,m Mex-
ican-Americans2 a and womenm in jury service. Trials also serve to reinforce
social and moral norms concerning appropriate behavior and to define the
boundaries of acceptable conduct.26
The fact that trials function symbolically to reinforce existing social
institutions may conflict with social science's skepticism about the premises
upon which those institutions are based. Stuart Nagel once expressed dis-
appointment that the Court only selectively used his data on the effect of
reducing jury size.?27 He assumed the Justices did not understand his
research. A more likely explanation is that the data were irrelevant. Nagel
was researching what effect jury size had on the quality of the verdict,
while the Court was concerned with the symbolism of using smaller juries m
Finally, the trial system plays an important role in the preservation of
social order, primarily by serving a crime control function.29 Trials provide
an apparently neutral way to legitimate the state's exercise of power over
its citizens and its claim of a monopoly over physical violence.20 To serve
these functions, trials must appear to be a viable method for resolving
conflicts so that citizens will bring their disputes to the legal system rather
than settle them in the streets. Trials must therefore appear to be fair.2 1
Giving interested parties their day in court is cathartic and limits the number
of times people take the law into their own hands?.32 Judge Jack Weinstein
calls this "tranquilizing disputants. '"123
221. Gold, supra note 186, at 498-500.
222. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
223. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98-99 (1986) (racial discrimination harms society).
224. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 n.4 (1954) (ancestry distinctions odious to free
people whose institutions are founded on the doctrine of equality).
225. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527-33 (1975) (a jury excluding women is at war
with the basic concepts of democratic society).
226. See Arenella, supra note 189, at 197-99; Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On
Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HIAv. L. Rnv 1357, 1360 (1985); see
also W HuRsr, LAw AND SOCIAL ORDER IN TH UN-mn STATEs 215-23 (1977) (criticizing law
generally for failing m this regard by excluding some groups from the. process, being susceptible
to influence by moneyed and other interest groups and for fostering a good deal of injustice).
227. M. SAKs & C. BARON, supra note 19, at 106-07 (citing Weinstein, Some Difficulties in
Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 CoLum. L. REv 223, 233 (1966)).
228. See, e.g., Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
229. See Belsky, supra note 177, at 772; Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An
Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 CoLuTM. L. REv. 436, 437-
38 (1980).
230. See Arenella, supra note 189, at 200-08.
231. See Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial, 60
S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1032-33 (1987).
232. See Leonard, supra note 204, at 2-3.
233. See Weinstein, supra note 176, at 241.
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The Court rarely is explicit about the role of the trial system in the
preservation of social order. The Justices do assert sometimes that rules
excluding incriminating evidence are bad because they generate disrespect
for law and the adminstration of justice.2 4 The Court's opinions also
repeatedly emphasize that some interests of the state deserve consideration
equal to, or greater than, that afforded to litigants. Thus, the Court accords
considerable weight to the state's interests in prosecuting its laws, 231 punish-
ing transgressors236 and even deporting illegal immigrants .2 7 Social science,
with its tradition of progressiveness and skepticism about social institutions
and the power of the state, may occasionally find itself at odds with the
Court's desire to preserve the current social order.
The best known example of the Court's concern with the preservation of
order is its series of death-penalty cases. In capital cases, the Court has
repeatedly stated its willingness to tolerate conviction-prone juries because
of the importance of the state's interest in prosecuting its criminal laws.2 8
It seems fairly clear from the cases that the Court believes the death penalty
is an important instrument of social control, functioning to deter crime and
reassure the citizenry that the state is doing something to protect it from
violence. Most of the Justices probably believe that using death-qualified,
conviction-prone juries facilitates these ends and therefore should be al-
lowed.
CONCLUSION
Much modern theory about the relationship between social science and
law suggests that courts should accord psychology a significant place in the
jurisprudence of trials, because science is culturally promnent,239 or can
help legitimate political decisions.24 Yet, the Supreme Court has consistently
refused to rely on empirical research about jury behavior when deciding
issues of proper trial procedure. It is not that the Court is completely
unscientific. The Justices are willing to rely on economucs and sociology
when making decisions in other areas of law. Nor is psychology totally
banished from the trial system-psychologists are used frequently as expert
witnesses, and lawyers rely on psychological research on jury behavior to
234. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984).
235. Wainwnght v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985); Gillock, 445 U.S. at 373.
236. See, e.g., Hasting, 461 U.S. at 509; Engle, 456 U.S. at 128.
237. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 872-73.
238. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175-76, 180-81; Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 423.
239. See R. MERTON, supra note 110, at 267
240. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 100-05 (government intervention undermines the
ideology of the free market; science and its appearance of objectivity legitimates nondemocratic
decisions).
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help them plan trial strategy. Therefore, the Court's aversion to empirical
psychological research in its jurisprudence of trials poses a puzzle. It suggests
that there are limits to the role of social science in modem jurisprudence.
Several possible explanations for the rejection of psychological research
can be eliminated. Psychology is not omitted because it is unavailable to
lawyers. Relevant research has been published in law journals, incorporated
in law school textbooks and brought to the Court's attention in briefs. Nor
is psychology rejected because its answers are always qualified or inconclu-
sive. The research on many issues faced by the Court indicates a clear
consensus among psychologists. Other explanations for the rejection of
psychology-fear that scientists will usurp power, political disjunction be-
tween liberal psychologists and conservative judges, the conceit of lawyers,
the unscientific nature of human reasomng, judges' lack of traimng and
experience in social science and the incompatibility of the two systems of
logic-are incomplete. They do not recognize that the Court sometimes
does, and sometimes does not, incorporate social science into its legal policy-
making.
This Article, suggests that for a body of empirical research to command
a place in jurisprudence, the science must reflect some of the same values
as a particular body of law. The more the two value systems converge, the
more completely will law accept the science. The more the normative
structures diverge, the greater will be the tendency of judges to reject the
science.
The Supreme Court has completely ignored the empirical research on jury
behavior because the scientific norms of psychology are fundamentally
incompatible with the Court's jurisprudence of trials. To the Supreme Court,
a proper trial must accommodate five different important principles: (1)
preserving the adversary structure, (2) promoting institutional efficiency, (3)
facilitating legally accurate verdicts, (4) symbolizing important aspects of
social ideology and (5) preserving social order. None of those principles is
important to psychological research. The science of psychology values factual
truth, umversalism, commumsm, disinterestedness, skepticism and progres-
siveness.
Thus, for example, even though empirical research shows that death-
qualified juries are conviction-prone and may not return accurate verdicts,
such research has been rejected by a Supreme Court that believes the death
penalty is an important element of social control. Even though research on
jury size demonstrates that small juries are less reliable than large ones, the
research has been irrelevant to a Court concerned primarily with the symbolic
importance of the jury. Even though research demonstrates that juries do
not follow instructions to disregard improper evidence, the research has had
little impact on the Court because efficiency favors jury instructions instead
of retrials.
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The only common ground for psychology and the jurisprudence of trials
would seem to be their mutual pursuit of truth. However, the two systems
seek and define truth quite differently. Scientific truth emerges from a
consideration of all data. Legal truth emerges from a rule-bound process
that excludes much information. Science is concerned with whether its results
are empirically verifiable. Law is concerned that the results of trials be
legally accurate. Scientific truth is general, probabilistic and arrived at over
time. Legal truth is individualistic, may be improbable and must be deter-
mined immediately.
This analysis suggests that there is a fundamental incompatibility between
psychology and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of trials. Their radically
different normative systems make communication between the disciplines
very difficult. The resulting intellectual chasm may explain why the Court
has so completely resisted scientizing its jurisprudence of trials. The Justices
simply cannot understand what the psychologists are saying.
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